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Future directions of consumer flood 
insurance in the UK
The risk of flooding, which is increasing due to climate change, cannot be eliminated despite 
engineering controls to manage it. Controversial issues concerning the introduction of a scheme, 
Flood Re, to ensure that households at risk of flooding can continue to purchase aﬀordable 
insurance against the risk have been discussed in numerous media reports, comments to public 
consultations and journal articles.
No reports, comments or articles, however, even begin to compare in quality or depth to this 
selection of papers and the issues raised in them. The papers examine and analyse critical issues 
that have not previously been raised. They contain valuable insights into the issues which must be 
resolved in order for Flood Re to succeed. 
The papers should be studied by everyone involved in the residential property sector including 
insurers, mortgage lenders, and their advisors. The failure to resolve the issues raised in the papers 
will not only deter the proposed transition to market-priced consumer flood insurance; it may well 
result in great uncertainty and loss of faith in Flood Re when claims are made following the next 
period of extensive – and inevitable – flooding in the UK.
Valerie Fogleman 
Cardiﬀ University School of Law and Politics
4Preface
Social management of disastrous events is a crucial challenge to modern society. Inertia means we 
will carry on as we always have done, in the face of increased complexity and increased risks from 
climate change, overpopulation and aging infrastructures. Floods are a particular case – on a warm 
summer’s day such as when this is being written, when the rivers are dwindling in their furrows and 
floods seem a distant prospect it is much too easy to stick one’s head in the sand and pretend that 
winter is not coming. Notwithstanding, on 25 June 2015, five researchers and a small audience met 
together in London to discuss flood insurance. The event was cross-disciplinary and between us, 
we spotted and discussed issues we had not separately thought of. Having the benefit of Professor 
Donald T Hornstein and Dr Swenja Surminski participating in the event was a privilege.
This volume contains the papers from the event. We asked the researchers to give us papers that 
were shorter than a regular academic paper, and which would be readable by an intelligent and 
interested consumer or professional. We hope that this collection points forward to some of the 
issues that those currently working hard on setting up Flood Re, which is scheduled to ‘go live’ in 
April 2016, will have to consider and possibly address in that work, while also providing a wider 
picture explaining why the provision of catastrophe insurance is such a diﬃcult task, when the need 
is so obvious and there is insurance available for everything from weddings to oil platforms.
We wish to thank ESRC for the Impact Acceleration funding making this project possible, Caspar 
Bartington and the Chartered Insurance Institute for their important support to the initial stages of 
the project and most of all Michael Davey QC and Quadrant Chambers who supported us when at 
the very last moment we needed to find a new venue.
1 July 2015
Mateusz Bek, James Davey and Johanna Hjalmarsson 
Insurance Law Research Group 
Southampton Law School 
University of Southampton
   5
Contents
The insurance industry on the cusp of cop 21: lessons from flood 
insurance reform in the US and UK 
Professor Donald T Hornstein __________________________________ 7
The role of flood insurance in reducing direct risk 
Dr Swenja Surminski __________________________________________ 15
Flood Re: Risk Classification and ‘Distortion of the Market’ 
Professor James Davey _______________________________________  26
Flood Re: together, though not all and not forever 
Mateusz Bek  _________________________________________________35
Adding insolvency to injury - a thought experiment on the rights of 
consumers, third parties and flood victims 
Johanna Hjalmarsson ________________________________________  41
6
The Thames Barrier near Woolwich
   7
The insurance industry on the cusp of COP 21:  
lessons from flood insurance reform in the US and UK 
Donald T. Hornstein1 
The reference to “COP 21” in the title of my paper is, of course, to the UN’s upcoming Conference 
of the Parties regarding international climate negotiations set to take place in December 2015.  And 
the subtext of my paper’s title asks whether the insurance industry is poised to play a meaningful 
role – either in the formal negotiation process itself or, more importantly, in actual near-term 
developments on the ground, at the interface of climate change and economic resiliency.  If I were to 
strip away all caveats, I’m sorry to say that my answer is, “no.”  
What’s more, if I am correct in my analysis, then my conclusion may be even more stark than it 
appears.  This is because the year 2015 is not simply a milestone year for the UN’s climate negotiation 
process.   It is also a year in which UN member states convened in Sendai, Japan for the Third 
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, with the aim of adopting a new world framework 
to reduce worldwide disaster losses of all kinds. And it is a year in which countries are scheduled 
to agree on a set of worldwide Sustainable Development Goals, measured through metrics such 
as poverty-reduction, improved education, food security, enhanced biodiversity, and reduced 
inequality.  Because weather-related disasters are the most ubiquitous of all types of disasters, when 
the insurance industry is absent from providing eﬀective weather-related cover, it simultaneously 
undermines not just the goals of climate resiliency, but also those of worldwide disaster risk 
reduction and global economic development. 
Despite some recent announcements about innovative, but relatively new, initiatives by which the 
insurance industry seeks to engage with climate change, my pessimism is anchored in the numbers.  
In its 2014 report on the competitive position of the London Insurance Market, the London Market 
Group found not only that, as to worldwide natural disasters, the percentage of insured losses 
against uninsured losses is small (neighbourhood of 25-30% insured, 65-70% uninsured), the gap is 
actually widening.2  This is doubly bad.  From the point of view of social tradeoﬀs, it means that more 
public money will be spent on disaster recovery, especially in developing economies, and therefore 
will be less available for the public expenditures necessary to reach goals in education, public-health, 
or poverty-reduction.3  
Even worse, without the risk-reduction incentives that a properly functioning insurance market 
would bring to areas prone to natural disasters, it is little surprise that the World Economic Forum 
reports in 2015 that less progress, rather than more,  has been made against risks from natural 
disasters over the past 10 years than has been made against risks such as infectious diseases, terrorist 
1 Aubrey L. Brooks Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, Member, Board of Directors, NC 
Insurance Underwriting Association
2 London Matters. Fig.29. 2014 London Market Group & Boston Consulting Group
3 UNISRD (2015) Global Assessment Rpt on Disaster Risk Reduction 7-8
8attacks, financial institution failure, or fiscal crises.4  With insurance on the sidelines, we’re likely to 
lose further ground.
Why look at flood insurance in the US and UK?
Of course, one easy way to explain lack of insurance market penetration in much of the world 
involves, simply, financial capability – or rather the lack of it in developing economies and would-be 
policyholders. Yet even here I’m not apt to give the insurance industry an easy out.  Although there 
has been innovation in micro-insurance, including developments in parametric insurance, my sense 
is that it has not been as robust as have been other developments in developing economies in such 
areas as telecommunications, energy, health care, and education.  
But, that said, it explains why recent developments in flood insurance in the US and UK are 
especially good places to appraise the likelihood of progressive reform.  Amongst all categories 
of losses from natural-disasters, losses from floods in both countries represent the lionshare of 
natural-disaster losses.  And these are not under-resourced countries. They are both home to mature 
insurance, real estate, and financial industries.  Where better to test the ability of the insurance 
industry to engage with climate-related catastrophe losses?
Flood insurance in the US 
Private insurers ceased writing flood insurance in the US in 1928, two years after the 1926 Mississippi 
River “Great Flood” that, among other things, almost destroyed New Orleans.  Shortly thereafter, 
there was introduced the practice of the federal government of making post-event disaster 
assistance payments directly to citizens.  Several years later, the federal government also undertook 
the country’s principal role in floodplain management through the Flood Control Act of 1936.  
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, federal expenditures grew significantly on both fronts, especially 
as expensive flood-control measures spawned development in floodplains only to see disaster 
payments increase when dams and levees failed.5
In 1968, Congress created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) – a purely governmental 
program of insurance in which administrative law, rather than insurance law, tends to be more 
apropos in resolving disputes.  To oﬀset the obvious moral hazard, it was oﬀered only to those 
in communities that themselves (the communities) agreed to adopt “floodplain management 
strategies and land-use codes acceptable to the federal government.” 4 In 1994, with evidence that 
the take-up rate of flood insurance was low, Congress made NFIP insurance mandatory for all 
homeowners financing their properties with federally backed mortgages.  To this day, however, take-
up rates still can range notoriously low.  After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, in poorer areas of Louisiana 
only 30% of property owners had flood insurance.6
There was never a promise that NFIP rates would be truly risk-based.  Instead, the original 
legislation promised “reasonable terms and conditions” – a commitment to aﬀordability that was 
always, and remains to this day, in tension with the concern over moral hazard.  The aﬀordability 
4 World Economic Forum. Global Risks 2015. Fig. 3.1
5 Wriggens, The Challenge of US Flood Ins. Reform, 119 Penn. St. L. Rev. 361.
6 Knox, 41 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L. J. 901, 911 (2006)
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commitment is reflected most famously in two common types of well-publicised, subsidised rates.  
First, properties built before 1974, when the first Flood Insurance Rate Maps were developed, 
became known as “pre-FIRM” properties and were given rates only 35-45% of “actuarial” rates.  
Second, subsidised rates were also given to “grandfathered” properties, those built after 1974 that 
were, when built, in compliance with then-existing flood maps – even if later maps revealed the 
property to be (or to have become) located in a flood zone.  Approximately 1 million properties, 
to date, fall into one of these two categories.  Of course, all of the 5.5 million NFIP flood policies 
could be said to receive subsidised rates because what the NFIP considers an “actuarial” rate in 
fact reflects the artificially lower baseline of skewed historical date ranges (that minimises recent 
flood events).  Not to mention that, at least so far, the NFIP does not consider the projected future 
eﬀects of climate change in rate calculations, a factor that further distorts downwards the NFIP’s 
“actuarial” calculation of its base “1/100” flood risk.  Financially, the NFIP was not designed to save 
unspent funds from one year to the next, nor does the NFIP purchase reinsurance.  No surprise, 
therefore, that after both Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, the NFIP required emergency 
congressional appropriations and/or debt authorisation to meet its obligations.  Frankly, this should 
not be viewed as unintended. The built-in default to supplemental appropriations after catastrophic 
outlier events (debt financing) is the design of the program. 
The 2012/2014 political convulsion over US flood insurance     
In 2012, Congress enacted the most sweeping overhaul of the NFIP in a generation when it passed 
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (Biggert-Waters).   Public policy aside, Biggert-
Waters was remarkable politically, enacted as a rare instance of bipartisanship in the 112th Congress, 
perhaps the most partisan Congress in modern US history.  The 112th Congress was the Congress 
that shut down the federal government over budget disagreements AND came within days of 
sovereign debt default.  An unusual coalition of Tea Party Republicans opposed to the NFIP’s debt 
financing and liberal environmentalists opposed to coastal natural-resource destruction fueled by 
cheap flood insurance for real-estate developments, united to create the bipartisan moment.  In 
terms of public policy, Biggert-Waters sought to move the NFIP toward more actuarially fair pricing.  
It did this by phasing out the NFIP’s pre-FIRM and grandfathered subsidies, with rate increases of 
as much as 25% per annum.  Rates for “severe-repetitive-loss” properties could rise even faster.  And 
a “sale trigger” provision instantly applied the full actuarial rate to any existing home upon its sale, 
thereby eliminating all subsidies instantly for the purchasers even of primary coastal residences.  
This was a far more ambitious commitment to actuarial pricing than is currently found in the UK’s 
Flood Re program (20-25-year phase-in of  “risk reflective” pricing).   President Obama signed the 
legislation.
It soon became evident that Biggert-Waters did not represent a political equilibrium.  In 2013, as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began phasing in the Biggert-Waters rate increases, 
and began an accelerated program of flood mapping that reclassified many properties into higher-
priced NFIP premiums, a grass-roots political movement among coastal residents and real-estate 
interests arose with the organisational slogan of Stop FEMA Now.  Looked at one way, it was simply 
an example of special-interest politics trumping general social welfare.  Looked at another way, it 
highlighted an obvious and recurring feature of climate-change policymaking; what, if anything, to 
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do in the transition-period to a better climate future for those economic and social interests that 
are caught in the dislocation.  Generally speaking, economic theory rationalises such dislocations 
as acts of creative destruction and celebrates, to use the modern term, disruption.  How law should 
operate during such transition periods is the subject of a more nuanced jurisprudential literature, 
often buttressed by legal doctrines and commitments to protect, or at least compensate, the loss 
of established property rights.  However it is described, there arose in 2013 and 2014 a real-life 
counterattack on Biggert-Waters that soon developed political traction. As America entered 2014, 
a special congressional election in February in Pinellas County, Florida (the St. Petersburg/Tampa 
area) tipped Republican when the Republican candidate was viewed as marginally more likely to 
protect property owners’ subsidised flood insurance rates.  The conventional wisdom was that 
this early election would showcase whether health insurance was a winning issue for Republicans 
(running against Obamacare).  It turned out that voters cared more about flood insurance than 
health insurance.  The message wasn’t lost back in Washington.  In March 2014, Congress enacted 
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Aﬀordability Act (Aﬀordability Act) that in many – but not all – 
respects reversed the Biggert-Waters rate increases.  Only about 40-50 members of the Tea Party 
opposed the Aﬀordability Act and staked out a consistent position against subsidised flood insurance 
rates.  Virtually everyone else in Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, simply reversed field.  
The Aﬀordability Act passed with lopsided majorities and President Obama, who could also read the 
political tea leaves, similarly reversed field and signed the legislation.
The aftermath: where things now stand with US flood insurance  
It would be a mistake to write oﬀ the 2012/2014 flood insurance convulsion as a simple matter of 
advance and retreat.  Although large rate increases for primary residences were reversed, that was 
not the case for secondary residences and severe-repetitive-loss properties, for which the first of 
several sizable annual rate increases went into force in April 2015.  The Aﬀordability Act also left intact 
a directive for FEMA to accelerate flood mapping and to investigate the possibility of buying private 
reinsurance to pre-fund worst-case scenarios.  Although it is too early to view these developments 
as presaging an opening for private flood insurers in the US, the possibility is there – for the first 
time since Congress created the NFIP in 1968.  Indeed, the first private primary flood insurer in the 
US, the Flood Insurance Agency, underwritten by Lloyds, opened immediately in the aftermath of 
Biggert-Waters.  And, although its market opening was narrowed within two years by the Aﬀordability 
Act, it is reportedly on track to write approximately 1% of US flood policies in 2015.  A second such 
private flood insurer, Homeowners Choice Property & Casualty, recently became the first private 
flood insurer to be regulated by the State of Florida to oﬀer flood insurance as an endorsement.  All 
this said, the private market for US flood insurance is embryonic.  Public flood insurance has only 
just begun to mimic the price signals that would be sent by a “real” insurance regime.  Moreover, 
beneath the surface of national politics, there are subterranean, state-by-state battles over 
projections of sea-level rise, the use of climate-change models in ratemaking, and the economic need 
to keep coastal insurance rates down to help local real-estate and tourist markets.  
In short, the prospects are possible, but low, for flood insurance in the US to prompt much 
meaningful climate-related adaptation or resilience in the near future.
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A peek at US wind – the conventional story
Although private Homeowners policies in the US have, since 1968, featured an exclusion for “flood,” 
that is not the case for wind damage, including damage from catastrophic wind events such as 
hurricanes, tornadoes, or severe thunderstorms. Yet this does not mean that the private insurance 
industry is engaged with these aspects of climate-related damages.  Especially in those Southeastern 
and Gulf states most susceptible to hurricanes and tropical storms, the major story since 1990 
has been the abandonment of coastal wind coverage by the private market and its absorption by 
“residual” state insurance entities, such as the North Carolina Insurance Underwriting Association 
on which I sit as a member of the Board of Directors.  The NCIUA now covers approximately 70% 
of the $130-billion in insured properties in North Carolina’s twenty coastal counties and famous 
Outer Banks.  Nationally, compared to $55 billion in insured assets in such plans in 1990, enrolment 
in state-run residual risk plans had, by 2012, skyrocketed to over $880 billion in loss exposure, an 
increase of 1,517 percent.7  This means that, at least circa 2012, the private, primary insurance market 
in the US has been leaving CAT wind coverage just as surely as it abandoned flood coverage fifty 
years before.   Most private insurers explain their abandonment of the CAT wind market to rate 
suppression by politically beholden state insurance commissioners.  But, whatever the reason, the 
overall trend supports my conclusion that major private insurers in the US, especially in the Gulf 
and Southeastern United States, are not especially engaged economically in climate-related risks.  
Indeed, they’ve actively taken measures to reduce that engagement.  
A peek at US wind – new developments
There are two often-overlooked aspects of US wind that may portend more meaningful engagement 
by the insurance industry with climate-related losses.  The first involves those state residual-
wind pools, such as the NCIUA, that seek to pre-finance worst-case losses through such market 
mechanisms as reinsurance, cat bonds, and other ILS products.  The NCIUA purchases between 
$80-100 million in reinsurance annually, chiefly from the Bermuda marketplace, to cover losses 
in excess of approximately $2 billion (which it finances through retained earnings and an ability 
to levy “assessments” on the state’s admitted property insurers).   But, in both its reinsurance 
and alternative financing arrangements, the NCIUA’s book of business is subject to private 
market scrutiny.  Recently, the State of Florida decided also to turn to private reinsurance and 
ILS mechanisms rather than rely solely on the State’s own public reinsurance facility, the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, which had been funded, when necessary, by post-event state debt 
obligations.  This shift to pre-finance through private market mechanisms may portend more by 
the broader insurance-related economic ecosystem with climate-related risks in the US.  That said, 
there is also reason for concern.  The NCIUA has recently been subject to political pressure against 
its use of reinsurance and ILS mechanisms to pre-fund the Association’s 1/100 PML – which some 
political actors view as a “waste” of money for storms that may not come.  In their place, the NC 
State Legislature is currently considering mechanisms that would make it easier for the NCIUA to 
use post-event bonding, perhaps portending a shift away from pre-financing through the private 
insurance industry toward post-event financing through the financial bond market.    To the extent 
this occurs, engagement with the insurance industry weakens.
7 Ins. Information Inst, US Residual Market: Total Policies in Force (1990-2012)       
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The other new development, only evidenced significantly within the past 18 months, has been a 
trend AWAY from state residual wind risk pools and toward private insurers through a mechanism 
know as depopulation.  Over the last two years, the State of Florida, in particular, has depopulated its 
state-run residual risk pool, Florida Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, by almost 50%.  As a 
general matter, the insurance companies taking on this wind risk are not major US property insurers. 
Instead, newly created companies, often established solely for the purpose of taking on depopulated 
policies, have been created, with financial structures that lay oﬀ much of the new risk to Bermuda-
based reinsurers.  The Bermuda reinsurance and ILS markets have, in recent years, enjoyed an 
explosion of available capital.  The sustainability of this arrangement, and the long-term solvency of 
the new insurers, remains to be seen.  But, should it prove stable, then an increase in private-market 
reengagement with climate-related wind losses could emerge.  
Observations of an american insurance scholar of the UK’s Flood Re scheme  
I make only three brief observations.  First, I oﬀer congratulations.  Compared to the US, the 
UK is now--  and under Flood Re will continue to be -- an example of how the private insurance 
market can be enlisted to engage in managing the risks of flooding.  One of the central claims in 
my own scholarly work has been that flood risks, given improved mapping, big data, and access 
to international financial markets, are now insurable risks – undercutting the central premise 
underlying the current, government-provided NFIP system in the United States.  
As to a positive relationship between Flood Re and climate-change resiliency, we’ll see.  Insurance 
always exhibits risk-spreading capabilities and risk-reduction possibilities, and it remains to be 
seen if the handing oﬀ of “flood defenses” to the government in the UK will, or will not, lead to 
sustainable floodplain management.  Certainly I support a recent proposal made earlier this month 
by the Chartered Insurance Institute to link flood insurance premiums to risk resilience certificates, 
thereby using rates to directly incentivise risk reduction. Indeed, I have hopes for a renaissance 
in the US of FEMA’s “Community Rating System” which oﬀers to reduce flood insurance rates 
for all members of a community that adopts extra risk-reduction measures beyond the minimum 
necessary to qualify for NFIP placement in the first place.  With the first, recent wave of flood rate 
hikes in the US under the Aﬀordability Act  having only been instituted in April 2015, there may finally 
be an incentive for communities to take the federal CRS program seriously.   All this said, it remains 
to be seen what shape “resiliency” takes.  There is a diﬀerence between development behind heavily 
armoured shorelines and riverbeds and development that is redirected away from such dynamic 
natural areas.  This is a fight that transcends insurance, but in which insurers surely can engage 
by better estimating, and publicising, the risks and benefits that attend hardscape “solutions” to 
flooding.  For any insurer covering risks that are located behind levees, dams, and barriers, careful 
attention should be paid to the US experience, where levees are notoriously categorised into those 
that have failed and those that will.  And, of course, although I note that Flood Re purports to 
protect to a 1/200-year PML (in contrast to the US 1/100 PML standard), it is unclear whether even 
that standard adequately reflects the worst-case risk projections that factor in the future eﬀects of 
climate change.  
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Finally, I oﬀer an observation about Flood Re’s financing and political stability.  I note that, like 
US government flood insurance, even Flood Re anticipates the government picking up the tab for 
truly catastrophic risks (beyond the 1/200 PML level), presumably via debt.  In the event of a UK 
version of Superstorm Sandy , which was purportedly a 1/500 year event, the UK government would 
have to step up, as did the US government.  Below this level, I note that Flood Re can itself purchase 
reinsurance for those risks ceded to it, via the international reinsurance or ILS markets – much 
like US wind residual risk organisations do in the US; another bit of convergence across climate-
related risk financing between the US and UK.  And finally, although I note that UK insurers may 
have some flexibility to price flood insurance appropriately, the UK is no more immune to political 
pressure from property owners and the real-estate industry than was the United States’ first attempt 
to reform US flood insurance. You may still have your Biggert-Waters/Aﬀordability Act moment of 
convulsion awaiting you.
Conclusion 
Forgive me for allowing a bit of optimism to creep back into my remarks, at least given the point from 
which I started at the beginning of this paper.  In fact, I believe the insurance industry has rightly 
been recognised for being the largest industry firmly on record in the fight to engage with risk-based 
and progressive climate change policy.  I have never had a problem with the industry talking the 
talk.  My pessimism has, instead, been at the current absence of industry engagement on the ground.  
Certainly in the US, the insurance industry has largely walked away from CAT weather-related 
risks, leaving it to government-run entities.  It is possible that the British insurance industry, with a 
financing assist from Flood Re, may begin to show the world how to walk the walk.  We’ll see.  
Bentley near Doncaster, England - 30 June 2007  
(Photo by Daniel Berehulak) ©iStock.com/EdStock
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The role of flood insurance in reducing direct risk
Swenja Surminski1 
Every day many individuals, organisations, governments and businesses buy insurance to transfer 
the risk of facing an uncertain loss in exchange for paying a certain premium. This mechanism 
has been used for centuries, spreading risks across a large number of  insureds. It has become an 
important cornerstone of economic activity and of social policy: without insurance many activities 
and processes would be deemed too risky and would not be undertaken, with those aﬀected by a loss 
left struggling to recover.
Whilst insurance has a primary role in sharing risks and distributing the costs of compensation and 
recovery, there is a further dimension beyond financial preparedness: purchasing an insurance risk 
transfer product can influence the behaviour of those at risk. This can either be in a moral hazard2 
context, where insurance can lead to a more risky behaviour, or as an incentive, where insurance can 
trigger risk reduction investments or the implementation of prevention measures (see for example, 
Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther et al., 2013; Linnerooth- Bayer and Mechler, 2009).
An established example of where insurance functions to minimise loss and disruption is through 
the provision of flood insurance. Flooding is one of the most commonly occurring natural hazards 
globally, aﬀecting on average about 70 million people each year (UNISDR 2011). In Europe flood 
damage resulted in average annual losses of €4.2 billion between 2000 and 2012. This is expected 
to rise into the future with an estimate of €23.5 billion of loss by the year 2050, as compared to an 
average of €4 billion in 2010 (Jongman et al. 2014).
This increasing risk of flooding is principally due to a rise in urban settlement, compounded by 
further socio-economic factors such as unsound planning and construction, as well as the expected 
impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2014 and IPCC, 2012). These growing losses are putting pressure 
on aﬀordability and availability of flood insurance – a challenge that is expected to increase into the 
future with more people and areas expected to be aﬀected. 
Insurance approaches
With the rapid increase in global economic losses from flooding, discussion has intensified among 
private insurers, governments and international organisations regarding the role of insurance 
in addressing these risks. In 2013 the European Commission launched the Green Paper on the 
insurance of natural and man-made disasters (EC, 2013), which reflects on the concerns about 
1 Senior Research Fellow, Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. s.surminski@lse.
ac.uk This is a shortened version of the following article:  Surminski, S. (2014). The role of insurance in reducing direct risk: the 
case of flood insurance. International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, 7(3-4), pp. 241-278.
2 Moral hazard occurs when a member of the party acts conversely to the principles set out in an agreement between those 
parties. For example in an insurance contract, the individuals’ motives and behaviour to prevent loss may be reduced if 
financially protected through a policy, thus resulting in an increased probability of loss. For more detail on moral hazard, see 
Arrow (1968) and Pauly (1968).
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rising risk levels and how this can be accommodated through new and existing flood insurance 
schemes. The consultation document frames insurance in two ways: the question of availability and 
aﬀordability, and the potential to use insurance as a lever for flood prevention and disaster damage 
mitigation. The EC specifically asks in the consultation how risk transfer can reduce disaster risks 
today and into the future.
To shed more light on this question it is important to reflect on if and how flood insurance is currently 
provided across diﬀerent countries. The use of insurance against flooding and other natural disaster 
diﬀers widely across the world (for example, see Paudel et al., 2012).   Penetration rates, types of 
product and operational mechanics of insurance schemes vary from country to country; for examples 
of flood insurance provision see Table 1. This range of approaches is determined by several factors 
including risk drivers, cultures, regulatory demands and the economic environment (Brainard 2008; 
Feyen et al., 2011, Hussels et al., 2005; Swiss Re 2004; USAID 2006).  Diﬀerences in provision across 
Europe is highlighted by  Table 1  below (see also Penning-Rowsell et al., 2014). 
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Table 1: Insurance coverage and penetration rate for diﬀerent natural catastrophes across Europe 
(Source: CEA, 2009)
Who provides and underwrites insurance is a key question: it remains unclear whether private or 
public insurance provision is more eﬀective. In the absence of a best practice template, Paudel et al. 
(2012) propose a greater focus on public-private partnerships, where the government and private 
insurers share the provision of underwriting. The term partnership is broadly used, but is rooted in 
eﬀorts to increase the eﬃciency of public service by engaging the private sector. For low and middle 
income countries the ClimateWise Compendium on disaster risk transfer (ClimateWise, 2011) 
diﬀerentiates between the risk transfer role and other roles, such as operational support functions. 
For the provision of the actual risk transfer for flood insurance the following picture emerges: The 
private sector is providing the actual risk transfer in 41% of schemes, with varying risk levels and 
volumes of insurance and reinsurance layers included in the diﬀerent schemes. In the majority of 
cases where the public sector is involved in risk transfer, it does so in partnership with the private 
sector (52%), see Figure 1 for the breakdown of risk transfer provision versus scheme type.
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Figure 1: Number of flood insurance schemes by scheme type and public-private involvement) 
(Source: Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2013).
The state often acts as an insurer of last resort, with governments expected to step in should private 
cover be insuﬃcient or unavailable. If markets are unattractive or the risks cannot be managed 
eﬀectively then the burden may shift towards government (Mills, 2005). This can lead to the 
development of new approaches to insurance  (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2008) for example, public 
private partnerships.
Risk reduction and insurance
When considering how to design and deliver an eﬀective insurance system, one aspect of long 
term delivery would be to respond to the concerns about rising risk levels through a greater 
linkage between insurance risk transfer and physical risk reduction measures. This is based on the 
hypothesis that insurance can play a role in driving risk behaviour. The IPCC’s  special report on 
managing the risk of extreme events (IPCC, 2012) concludes that ‘risk sharing (formal insurance, 
micro-insurance, crop insurance) can be a tool for risk reduction and for recovering livelihoods’ 
particularly in the face of extreme weather events, but warns that it could also provide disincentives, 
if not correctly structured. The key message emerging from this literature is that the design and 
implementation of a risk transfer scheme will determine the promotion of risk reduction and the 
level of moral hazard (Ranger et al., 2011). 
In theory insurance can attach a price tag to risks and send a signal to agents such as policy holders, 
governments or insurers themselves, incentivising or even forcing them to address the underlying 
risk (see, for example, Kunreuther 1996, Botzen et al., 2009; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009; 
Shilling et al., 1989; Treby et al., 2006). 
When the premium is priced in line with the risk, insurance can act in two fundamental ways; for 
example, it can prevent settlement in an area of increased flood risk with the premium payment (as 
compared to a lower risk zone) expected to deter people away from such areas - this also has the 
additional benefit of not impacting on the wider community, such as the tax payer or other policy 
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holders through ex post aid and subsidised premiums respectively (Filatova, 2013). Secondly, risk 
reflective pricing can encourage engagement with mitigation measures (Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan, 2009), for example through insurance discounts once the measures are installed.  Examples 
of such measures are 
 − Flood proofing of buildings and property,
 − Retrofitting of houses (e.g. against windstorm),
 − Local flood protection measures
 − Flood proofing infrastructure
 − Building larger scale flood protection schemes
 − Switching to more heat and drought resistance cultivars
 − Implementation of  more eﬃcient irrigation measures
 (from Bräuninger et al., 2011)
Recent studies have explored the link between premium pricing and use of flood risk reduction 
measures, for example through interviews with the insured, hypothetical modelling and willingness 
to pay exercises: Thieken et al. (2006) found that in Germany insured households are more likely 
to undertake risk reduction measures than uninsured, suggesting that flood insurance sets an 
incentive for policy holders to take action.  For the Netherlands, Botzen et al. (2009) suggests that 
many homeowners would be willing to make investments in risk reduction if this would lead to 
an insurance premium reduction: ‘In particular, approximately two-thirds are willing to invest in 
water barriers (…) and about a fifth are willing to replace floor types that are vulnerable to flooding 
with water resistant floor types. Furthermore, about a quarter are willing to move central heating 
installations to floors safe against flooding’ (Botzen et al., 2009).  
But practice shows that a range of factors prevents this from happening at a wider scale: The largest 
barrier is considered to be the absence of adequate risk-based pricing (Kunreuther, 1996) due to 
its conflict with aﬀordability of cover, while the solidarity principle of insurance also hampers 
risk reflective pricing. But even if risk-based pricing would be applied Bräuninger et al. (2011) 
note several issues that would need to be addressed in order to achieve risk reduction: mis-match 
between required prevention investment by policy holders and the premium savings; the short term 
nature of insurance contracts;  simplified rating structures used by insurers;  as well as a prevailing 
uncertainty about the benefits of risk reduction measures due to lack of standardised assessment 
methods, and the need for active involvement of policy holders to put in place and operate 
those mitigation measures (Bräuninger et al., 2011).  Other barriers to linking risk reduction and 
insurance exist and include limited institutional capacity, weak regulatory systems and insuﬃcient 
understanding of the instruments amongst stakeholders, which are particularly relevant in 
developing countries (Suarez and Linnerooth–Bayer 2011; Surminski and Oramas-Dorta, 2013).    
One particular aspect to consider in this context is the case for long term contracts, which may 
create incentives for homeowners to implement risk reducing measures. However, these multi-
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year contracts come with a range of limitations (Maynard and Ranger, 2011). An assessment of 
long-term flood insurance contracts in the Netherlands finds that the pricing of such contracts is 
complicated because of the uncertain future eﬀects of climate change on flood risks, which could 
result in mark ups of long-term insurance premiums (Aerts and Botzen, 2011). Nevertheless, a study 
of the demand for long-term insurance products has shown that consumers may have a higher 
willingness-to-pay for long-term flood insurance, than annual flood insurance because they prefer 
the price stability oﬀered by long-term contracts (Botzen et al., 2013). Further work is required to 
determine how pricing and the potential for long term insurance contracts continues into the future, 
particularly when the understanding of climate change and modelling accuracy is expected to evolve 
significantly in coming years.
A range of activities and initiatives indicate that there is potential for linking risk reduction and 
risk transfer: Surminski (2010) provides an illustration of how some insurers are engaged in risk 
reduction activities in the context of climate adaptation (Table 2). The initiatives identified are all 
based in established insurance markets. They include raising awareness of disaster risks, promoting 
action by government, and supporting action by individuals through incentives, information, 
financial support and terms and conditions for policies. 
Number Title Country Adaptation focus
1 The Austrian Insurance Trade Association and 
HORA – the creation of a natural disaster
Austria Promoting flood risk awareness through 
government partnership on flood risk data
2 Aviva’s flood simulation exercise in Boroughbridge UK Facilitating community based flood resilience 
3 RSA’s Mayesbrook Park Restoration UK Supporting a pilot project to demonstrate 
community-level flood risk management 
4 Insuring and managing flood risk – the Statement 
of Principles and the Association of British 
Insurance 
UK Partnering with government to achieve changes 
to the planning system, increased risk awareness 
and more investment in flood risk management 
measures
5 Royal Star Assurance’s Digital Aerial Mapping Bahamas/
Cayman
Changing the approach to assessing and pricing 
wind storm risk
6 RMS’s analysis of the Windstorm Mitigation Credit 
system in Florida 
Florida, 
USA
Incentivising wind-storm risk reduction measures 
through a regulator-driven premium discount 
service
7 Caravan protection from half storm by Allianz Germany Reducing hail-losses through a broker-led 
prevention initiative, funded through climate 
change mitigation
8 Insurance Research Lab for Better Homes in 
Canada – The Three Little Pigs Project 
Canada Promoting weather-resilience through industry 
led research
9 The Insurance Council of Australia’s work on 
community resilience 
Australia Promoting windstorm and bush fire 
risk management by clarifying roles and 
responsibilities of diﬀerent stakeholders
10 Swiss Re’s research on the ‘Economics of Climate 
Adaption’
Global Guidance and assistance to political decision 
makers on climate resilience 
Table 2: Case study examples form Surminski (2010) of risk reduction activities driven by insurers.
Despite these initiatives, it remains unclear to what extent they are eﬀective and how they could be 
scaled up if deemed a success.  For example the terms and conditions of an insurance policy, such 
as deductibles and exclusions, are widely used to manage risks in commercial insurance and motor 
insurance, but are facing some limitations in property insurance. These aim to prevent moral hazard, 
but also seek to maintain the insurability of high risk properties. This is evident in the UK residential 
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property market, where flood deductibles are being applied to homes that have been flooded several 
times (Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f583bba0-55af-11e2-bdd2-00144feab49a.
html#axzz33JiJgRmN).  But the eﬀectiveness in reducing moral hazards in relation to residential 
natural catastrophe risks remains unclear. A survey of 400 homeowners in the UK by Lamond et 
al. (2009) shows that insurers have been ineﬀective in encouraging their policyholders to adopt 
flood mitigation measures. As Ball et al. (2013) state, the adoption of property level measures is 
diﬃcult to assess so insurers do not necessarily see them as a basis for lowering policy costs.  While 
there is evidence for risk information work conducted by the industry, providing online flood risk 
information and raising awareness with customers and government (ABI 2012), this is not linked to 
the insurance policy documentation.
In the United States, the National Flood Insurance Programme (NFIP) includes building code 
regulations and mitigation grant programmes at part of its requirements for cover (Paudel et al., 
2012; Thomas and Leichenko, 2011). This entitles policyholders who have gone beyond minimum 
requirements for building elevation to be eligible for premium discounts. It also applies to 
communities with adequate risk management plans, who can receive premiums discounts for all 
those policyholders in the community by participating in a Community Rating System. In France, 
deductibles can be increased for policyholders who live in communities that face repeated flooding 
and do not have adequate risk mitigation plans which include damage mitigation measures, while 
deductibles are lowered if such plans and risk reducing measures are taken (Poussin et al., 2012). In 
developing countries there are also a few examples of direct operational link between risk transfer 
and risk reduction, for example: The Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program 
in Ethiopia and the Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario (FMRA) in Bolivia.  How eﬀective these 
mechanisms are is diﬃcult to measure, particularly as some of them have only been running for a 
short time.
Flood insurance in the United Kingdom - a missed opportunity ?
There are a range of political motivations at play when considering introduction or reform of flood 
insurance schemes, showing that the pendulum of political support can swing in many directions 
(see for example Schwarze and Wagner (2007) for an analysis of the German natural hazard 
insurance market).  On the one hand there is the aim of reducing current public expenditure for 
flood losses, while at the same time there are political considerations such as the need to maintain a 
visible ‘helping hand’ function after a disaster. This is particularly relevant in the run-up to elections, 
as an elected oﬃcial may deliberately not choose to increase spending and hence raise taxes within 
their elected period, particularly when no clear benefits are visible during this time. 
The United Kingdom presents an interesting example of a unique flood insurance approach, through 
a partnership between government and industry: the underwriting is provided by the private sector, 
while government maintains a role in terms of flood risk information and flood management. This 
relationship was formalised through the Statement of Principles, an approach that is now being 
reviewed.  The new system, Flood Re, scheduled to start in 2016 appears to have less emphasis on 
the role of public risk management (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014), focusing on sharing the financial 
burden of flooding rather than addressing rising flood risks. 
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At the start of the negotiations a set of principles were agreed between industry and government 
(Box 1) outlining a joint vision for flood insurance. This has a clear emphasis towards aﬀordability 
and availability of insurance provision, but also recognises the role of risk reduction in securing the 
long-term viability of flood insurance. 
Principles 
1. Insurance cover for flooding should be widely available.
2. Flood insurance premiums and excesses should reflect the risk of flood damage to the 
property insured, taking into account any resistance or resilience measures.
3. The Provision of flood insurance should be equitable.
4. The model should not distort competition between insurance firms.
5. Any new model should be practical and deliverable.
6. Any new model should encourage the take up of flood insurance, especially by low-income 
households.
7. Where economically viable, aﬀordable and technically possible, investment in flood risk 
management activity, including resilience and other measures to reduce flood risk, should be 
encouraged. This includes, but is not limited to, direct Government investment. 
8. Any new model should be sustainable in the long run, aﬀordable to the public purse and oﬀer 
value for money to the taxpayer. 
Box 1: Principles for flood insurance, source: Defra (2011) p.5.
However, achieving all of these aims is proving extremely diﬃcult and there are even potential 
trade-oﬀs that appear hard to overcome (Surminski et.al. 2015). The proposed scheme, Flood Re, 
takes principles 1, 3 and 8 at its core and aims to ‘ensure the availability and aﬀordability of flood 
insurance, without placing unsustainable costs on wider policyholders and the taxpayer’ (Defra 
2013a). Meanwhile the ‘value for money’ aspect of this is highly debatable as the scheme does not 
meet the minimum government standard for cost-benefits (Defra 2013a p.30; Defra 2013b). The lack 
of risk reduction is clear in the oﬃcial proposal other than in the Memorandum of Understanding, 
setting out the government’s commitment to flood risk management and joint eﬀorts to improve 
flood risk data (Surminski and Eldridge, 2013).
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Table 3  shows the  very limited use of formal incentive mechanisms in the existing SoP and in the 
newly proposed Flood Re scheme. (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014)
Depending on design and implementation an insurance scheme can send signals to policy makers 
in support of flood risk management policies, which would address risk levels and provide political 
guidance. The clearest link would be a financial liability, which makes government responsible for 
paying certain losses above a loss threshold with an interest in keeping losses low. This concept 
is absent from the Statement of Principles (SoP) scheme, and also from the proposed Flood Re. 
Throughout the negotiations between industry and government this appears to have been a critical 
aspect and even now there is lack of clarity about how catastrophic losses that might exhaust the 
pool would be dealt with.
The agreement from insurers to provide cover under the SoP is based on the expectation that 
government would deliver on their commitment of suﬃcient investment in flood defences and 
an improved public planning policy, outlined as clear indicators in the main SoP agreement 
document: As ‘action from Government’ it lists ‘reducing the probability of flooding in the UK; at 
least maintaining investment in flood management each year and discuss future funding taking 
into account climate change, implement reforms to the land use planning system; communicate 
flood risk eﬀectively and provide more detailed higher quality flood risk information and develop an 
integrated approach to urban drainage’ (ABI 2005). While the fulfilment of these policy demands has 
been subject to debate – particularly with regards to investment levels, but also about the success of 
the planning system – it is a clear lever to steer public policy and government spending, particularly 
in times of public spending constraints.
The debate about flood insurance in the UK illustrates a fundamental challenge: the concern about 
aﬀordability is usually seen in a short-term perspective, often driven by election cycles, while there 
is no strategy for the longer-term. The longer term risk concerns are often the easiest to sacrifice, 
not just because of election cycles and short-termism of policy makers, but also due to the one-year 
nature of most insurance contracts. Hence insurance is being used to redistribute risk of loss, in 
order to address social inequities, but not to reduce the underlying risks.
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Conclusion
Risk transfer alone, without consideration of risk reduction eﬀorts, is not a sustainable solution 
going forward, particularly in the context of a changing climate and rising flood losses. Moral hazard 
is a key challenge for any insurance product, as it can undermine the economic benefits of risk 
transfer and the wider eﬀorts to reduce risks. While stakeholders have only limited direct control 
over the occurrence of a flood, their actions determine the extent of losses during and after the 
event. Therefore moral hazard can occur at government level, where the existence of an insurance 
scheme may reduce the urgency to prevent and reduce risks, or at the insured level, where the 
purchase of insurance may lead to a false sense of security.  In theory, risk-based pricing should help 
prevent moral hazard and promote risk reduction behaviours. Evidence of how this works in practice 
is limited. Due to aﬀordability concerns this may have to be linked to public financial support 
measures at least on a temporary basis. There is evidence of a range of further activities conducted 
by the insurance industry to foster disaster prevention eﬀorts, but it remains unclear to what extent 
they are eﬀective at household level and to what extent they could be scaled up if deemed a success. 
Other stakeholders may be needed to reflect on the risk reduction potential, such as property 
developers, home-builders and mortgage providers in the context of property insurance. 
One important conclusion is to avoid the situation where risk reduction is seen as a trade-oﬀ with 
aﬀordability and availability. Considering these aspects as mutually reinforcing seems to be a more 
sensible approach. One could argue that risk reduction eﬀorts are essential in maintaining the 
insurability of these risks, especially in the context of flooding and other extreme weather events, and 
that eﬀective adaptation may actually become a condition for granting insurance cover in the future. 
However, there are also some clear limitations: While some risks arising from flooding can be 
reduced through better preparedness, there will always be residual risks that can leave those 
exposed with significant financial gaps and increase poverty.  What can insurance oﬀer for those 
risks ‘beyond risk reduction’ – such as land-loss due to sea level rise? This is starting to be addressed 
as part of the Loss and Damage discourse within the international climate change negotiations (see 
UNFCCC, 2010, para. 25-29).   Progress in this area depends on more clarity on the limitations of 
insurance as a tool and insurance as a private sector oﬀering.  
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Insurance law, at least in the United Kingdom, has the reputation for being simply a sub-set of 
contract law rules, and of little social significance. This reputation is ill-deserved, because the 
regulation of insurance pricing plays a fundamental role in the relationship between citizen, markets 
and the State. Access to insurance is a vital element in functioning as a citizen, although this is 
often underplayed by insurers. In this paper we examine the role of Flood Re in continuing the long 
tradition of subsiding the real cost of flood cover for residential properties, and the consequential 
diﬃculties this creates for markets, insurers and non-residential markets.
The Water Act 2014 signals the move to a formal system of subsidy of high-risk houses, but on the 
proviso that this subsidy is temporary- it is to be phased out of the next 20-25 years. This statutory 
scheme was heavily influenced by the insurance industry, who argued repeatedly for the removal of 
this ‘distortion of the market’. Attempts elsewhere to shift the cost of natural disaster risk away from 
the State and on to the market have largely been unsuccessful. The question is whether Flood Re can 
buck this trend.
[II]. The Flood Re scheme: thoughts and criticisms
1. A summary of the Flood Re proposals
The statutory scheme developed under the Water Act 2014 (and referred to in this paper by its 
colloquial name of Flood Re) is part way through its development. Much of the detail is to be 
determined under delegated powers, and at present we only have a draft of many of the Statutory 
Instruments that will flesh out the bare bones. Since these draft Regulations were published, the 
Government has agreed further changes to the scheme and so it represents something of a  
moving target.
Other papers in this collection are concerned with the role of Flood Re as a reinsurer. This paper 
concentrates instead on its related role as a method of controlling prices in the residential flood 
risk market. S. 64(3) Water Act 2014 empowers the Secretary of State (here, of DEFRA) to make 
‘provision as to levels of reinsurance premiums payable by relevant insurers under the FR scheme…’ 
The draft Regulations1 produced under this power provide for two diﬀerent pricing structures, 
covering ‘England, Wales & Scotland’ and ‘Northern Ireland’. For the mainland jurisdictions, the 
Regulations produce a progressive pricing model, with prices rising from a Band A Council Tax 
* Professor of Insurance and Commercial Law; Director, Insurance Law Research Group, University of Southampton. This is a 
revised version of a paper delivered at Quadrant Chambers (26/06/15). Correspondence is welcome to J.A.Davey@soton.ac.uk.
1 The (draft) Flood Reinsurance Scheme Funding and Administration Regulations 2015.
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property up to Band G.2 Under the draft Regulations, Band H (the most expensive houses) was not 
included, but the Government has let it be known that it is now prepared to include these in the 
scheme. We do not yet have the details for Band H. Each band provides a cap on the rate that will be 
charged by the reinsurer for accepting the risk, and this provides an eﬀective price cap, even for the 
most high risk homes. 
Individual insurers will be free to decide for themselves whether to cede the risk to Flood Re, but 
this decision will be substantially influenced by the availability of reinsurance at capped rates. It is 
analogous to the retailer of a consumer good (‘a widget’) having to decide at what price to sell their 
wares. Imagine that widgets are a social good, purchased annually by 75% of the population.3 Widgets 
can be very expensive to transport, and delivery costs mean that for some households the total cost 
of buying a widget can be ten times that of those in neighbouring communities. The retailer can 
manufacture and deliver the widgets itself, or source them from a third party supplier, but a State 
backed supplier will supply them to retailers, and deliver them to consumers, in packaging badged 
with that of the retailer, for a price that is capped at £X. The level of the cost charged by the State 
([X]) is determined by the value of the purchaser’s home.
In such circumstances, we would expect a market to operate for purchasers of widgets where 
delivery costs are low, and for retailers to supply via the State for consumers who would normally be 
charged [X] or above.4 Moreover, as the State supplier would be providing goods at less than cost, we 
might anticipate some potential moral hazard issues (high cost purchasers buy widgets when they 
would not normally do so) and we would need to find a revenue source for the State entity.
Flood Re faces these same issues. First, it should be noted that it is a body created by statute, and 
exercising a number of quasi-public functions (collection of mandatory fees) but is not formally a 
part of the executive branch. It would likely to be classed as a public body for many administrative 
law processes. Second, the ‘delivery cost’ issue with the widgets is replaced by the actuarial cost 
of insuring flood risks, which similarly varies by neighbourhood. Flood Re will have a maximum 
price it can charge for flood risk coverage, and this will subsidise high-risk properties with below-
cost provision of insurance. This will be branded as part of the product supplied by the consumer’s 
normal residential property insurer; indeed in many cases the end consumer will be unaware of the 
role of Flood Re in this market. The doctrine of privity is in full force here - the contract of insurance 
remains between the consumer and the property insurer (and not Flood Re). Thirdly, the subsidy to 
those who would be priced above £X needs to be funded. In the Flood Re example this is by imposing 
a levy on all purchasers, and separately on all retailers, of domestic property insurance cover. Other 
papers in this bundle look in more detail at the financial stability of the Flood Re project, and we pass 
quickly over this concern. Our interest is in the micro-economic consequences of the State requiring 
a good to be provided below cost, by means of a subsidy imposed on all.
2 Schedule to the draft Regulations, above n 1.
3 ONS Family Expenditure Survey, (2012): 76% of 26.4m UK households had contents insurance (with average spend of £174 p.a.) 
and 64% had buildings insurance (£216 p.a.). ‘Weather’ claims were second largest source of domestic property loss, after 
‘escape of water’, ABI UK Insurance Key Facts 2014, p. 7.
4 The retailer will still wish to make some profit, and will bear some administrative costs, so the line will fall close to X, but not at 
£X itself.
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There are many ways in which insurance might be subsidised, but in Flood Re it is by a largely 
invisible redistribution from low-risk properties to high-risk properties. The subsidy is ‘largely 
invisible’ to those on whom it is levied because it is relatively small (approximately £10 per 
household per year) and bundled within a broad insurance policy covering many other property 
risks. Unlike previous non-statutory arrangements, the practice of subsidising those in high risk 
areas out of the general pool of insureds will be restricted to residential properties only. The 
current expectation is that the business insurance market for real property, contents and business 
interruption will operate on a free-market basis.
2. A brief summary of ‘risk classification’ regulation in the UK, EU and beyond
Private insurance can be provided on a mutual basis, a solidarity basis or a hybrid model.5 A ‘mutual’ 
market allows pricing to float freely on the assumption that insurers will compete through their 
underwriting processes to price according to risk. A ‘solidarity’ market would not tie price to risk and 
could either charge a flat rate (‘community pricing’) or base it on some other variable (income, asset 
value etc). A hybrid market (and many in the UK have this approach) allows some risk factors to be 
priced by the market and controls other factors. Anti-discrimination laws (and codes of conduct) on 
gender, race, disability, genetic status etc are all examples of controls in markets that otherwise price 
according to market pressures.
The initial position in Flood Re is a hybrid: a partially subsidised model of property insurance (with 
many underwriting factors operating at market rates, and a subsidy for flood risk) and is a typical 
modern insurance market. State intervention in insurance markets is not unusual; it is the norm in 
many jurisdictions. However, State intervention in insurance markets is a deeply political choice. 
The role of insurers as a form of ‘regulator beyond the State’ - pricing risk and influencing behaviour 
- has been a focus of academic inquiry in the last decade.6 Insurers are generally keen to deny their 
social significance and prefer to assert insurance as a purely contractual process. This is largely 
unconvincing, but insurers cannot be criticised for seeking to minimise the level of government 
intervention.
3. Council tax bands: removing the subsidy by national pricing structures
The Flood Re administration will cap prices by reference to Council Tax bands. As the level of these 
caps are to be amended over time - to move towards market pricing, there is a genuine question 
about how that ought to be done.
The problem is that the level of Band A – H houses varies considerably between regions and is not 
perfectly correlated with levels of disposable income. It represents instead historic diﬀerences in 
property value.
5 D Wilkie ‘Mutuality and solidarity: assessing risks and sharing losses’ (1997) 352 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 1039.
6 See here the extensive literature on ‘insurance as governance’, including J Simon, ‘The Ideological Eﬀects of Actuarial 
Practices’ (1988) 22 Law & Soc’y Rev 771 & R Ericson et al ‘The moral hazards of neo-liberalism: lessons from the private 
insurance industry’ (2000) 29 Economy and Society 532.
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By contrast, the ratio between commercial entities (the number of very small businesses compared 
to the number of medium sized or large firms) is extraordinarily consistent across England.
The charts below demonstrate this disparity:FIGURE 1: COUNCIL TAX BAND BY REGION [ONS, 2014]7 
 
 
FIGURE 2: BUSINESS SIZE BY REGION [ONS, 2014]8 
 
 
Let us take one example: by how much should the cap on Council Tax Band A be altered to allow 
gradual adaptation to market-pricing? In London, only the bottom 4% of properties are in Band A, 
and this represents very poor quality housing stock, and it is likely that the residents would be 
highly sensitive to increases in the cost of insurance without some matching increase in welfare 
support for the low-waged. By contrast, 55% of the North East falls within this category and this 
will capture a wide range of personal circumstance, including those with a clear margin of 
discretionary spending. If national pricing is to be maintained, then either the (relatively) affluent 
householders in Bands A, B, C of the North East will continue to be subsidised, or the lowest 
                                            
7 Data sourced from ONS dataset ‘Council Tax Valuation List: Summary’.  
8 Data sourced from ONS dataset ‘Enterprise/local units by Employment size band, Legal status and Region’ (2014). 
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Figure 2: Business Size by region [ONS, 2014]8
et us take ne exa ple: by how much should the cap on Council Tax Band A be altered to allow 
gradual adaptation to market-pricing? In London, only the bottom 4% of properties are in Band A. 
This represents very poor quality h using tock, and it is likely that he resident  would be highly 
sensitive to increases in the cost of insurance without some matching increase in welfare support 
for the low-wage . By co trast, 55% of the North Eas  falls within t is category and this will capture a 
wide range of personal circumstance, including those with a clear margin of discretionary spending. 
If national pricing is to be maintained, then either the (relatively) aﬄuent householders in Bands 
A, B and C of the North East will continue to be subsidised, or the lowest categories of London 
inhabitants will be at risk of being forced into the uninsured category. There are well-respected 
7 Data sourced from ONS dataset ‘Council Tax Valuation List: Summary’.
8 Data sourced from ONS dataset ‘Enterprise/local units by Employment size band, Legal status and Region’ (2014). This chart 
sums categories: ‘Company’; ‘Sole Proprietor’; ‘Partnerships’ and ‘NGOs’ by region.
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insurance commentators (eg Kenneth Abraham9) who would advocate leaving the markets to price, 
and having the welfare state support those who need assistance. What ought not to occur is to 
require Flood Re to attempt to perform both tasks - it will need to be integrated into Welfare State 
planning. Ironically, the consistent level of SMEs across England means that a Flood Re based on 
business size would face much less obvious diﬃculties across regions.
4. Risk pooling for the aﬄuent insured? Risk pooling for the impecunious uninsured?
One of the diﬃculties in codifying a market practice is the failure to recognise that a change in form 
may require a change in substance. It is entirely appropriate that the insurance industry should seek 
to produce a fund to subsidise high risk insureds by means of crude, equal contribution. The industry 
is not the State: this does not mean that it is appropriate for that same crude method to be used 
when formalised into a form of taxation. At present, the level of the levy (£10.50) is not likely to have 
significant impact on insurance consumption. But there is a real problem in the United Kingdom 
with the impecunious uninsured. According to ONS data, around one-quarter of the population have 
no contents insurance, and this is disproportionately typical of low-income groups.10 At this level, 
even £10.50 may represent a significant factor aﬀecting purchasing behaviour for some marginal 
cases. By contrast, the £10.50 levy for eg Group H houses is likely to almost never change purchasing 
behaviour. Even strict ‘transaction cost’ economists accept that the more money you have, the less 
utility each extra £1 brings.11 Given that it is generally accepted that the levy will represent a form of 
taxation, it is surprising that it does not follow the normal pattern of taxation, with ability to pay (or 
asset value) as a factor on a sliding scale.
Losses which have an impact on the uninsured will fall on them, or more likely, the welfare state 
and charity. Flood Re is only of use to those who are insured, and the level of uninsured losses is 
only likely to rise as the subsidy is gradually removed from the market. There is therefore a need for 
future proofing welfare provision in this area, and ‘joined up’ thinking in this area would involve the 
Department of Welfare & Pensions in discussions alongside DEFRA.
5. ‘Mandated discloure’ of subsidy: why?
One of the changes made to the Water Act 2014 as it passed through Parliament was the possibility 
of mandated disclosure by insurers to customers of the level of subsidy.12 This is a classic example of 
modern regulatory intervention: mandated disclosure is a much-used method. Unfortunately, it is 
also singularly subject to criticism as ineﬀective.13 Unless there is a clear demand for the data, it will 
largely be ignored. Flood data where significant is already likely to be part of the property valuation 
process. The provision of this information to consumers alone - without eg eﬀorts to tie it into the 
conveyancing process or the EPC report that vendors provide - is likely to be wasted eﬀort.
9 K Abraham Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy (Yale Univ Press, 1986).
10 See above, n 3.
11 This distinguishes utility from wealth.
12 S. 67(4) Water Act 2014 permits this to be done by Regulation.
13 O Ben-Shahar ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 U Pa L Rev 647.
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[III]. Eligibility: consumers and others
Given the ‘framework’ nature of the Water Act 2014, much of the crucial legal detail is yet to be 
determined. Part of the gap is intended to be filled by the (draft) Regulations, but the government 
has confirmed some changes to these (eg band H inclusion) and other changes may be under 
discussion in private. The issues discussed below are therefore based on general issues that require 
attention.
The Water Act 2014 is meant to apply to ‘household premises’ only, and not to business properties. 
The Secretary of State is empowered to define, by Regulation, the limits of the scheme, but it is not 
clear that this will be an easy task. The assertion by the Association of British Insurers that ‘Flood Re 
will establish clear rules for ‘borderline’ cases such as “Bed and Breakfast” properties’14 is a triumph 
of hope over experience. The draft Regulations contain an incomplete version which is somewhat 
circular: ‘“household premises” means a dwelling which is covered by a home insurance policy and 
meets the criteria set out in [BB] of the FR Scheme’. Dwelling is then further defined as: ‘any land 
and building in the United Kingdom that is held by the occupier for private, domestic and residential 
use (whether or not with others), including a house or other single dwelling; and any property which 
forms part of, or is enjoyed with, the dwelling’.15
 Legal definitions of similar boundaries, such as ‘consumer’ have normally been left deliberately 
vague. There is a good reason for this- the range of borderline cases is extremely wide, and it is more 
eﬃcient to resolve these hard cases in an ad hoc fashion when required, than to produce a complete 
taxonomy. However, insurers looking to cede to Flood Re will need to know in advance the limits of 
reinsurance cover, particularly where the flood risk element is substantial.
Consider the standard definition of ‘consumer’ in UK and EU legislation. Section 1, Consumer 
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 defines an insurance consumer as: ‘an 
individual who enters into the contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to the 
individual’s trade, business or profession’.
Contained within this are two immediate areas of uncertainty: it is (partly) what lawyers would 
call ‘open textured’. First, when is the insured an individual? This is presumably meant to exclude 
legal persons such as charities, limited companies and partnerships. This is a ‘status’ question and 
can be defined away. Second, we have an activity related question: is the insurance wholly or mainly 
unrelated to business activity? This requires the exercise of judgement. If the definition was ‘wholly 
unrelated’ then we could apply a strict approach and find some certainty. But ‘mainly unrelated’ will 
lead to numerous boundary disputes, not of all which could be predicted in advance.
Why then is the definition not simple and judgment free? Human society is messy, complex 
and rapidly changing. Within 30 years the number of people working from home has changed 
dramatically. It is more eﬃcient for regulatory boundaries to be written with a degree of flexibility, 
even if they are slightly porous as a result. The reason for this is simple: most cases settle.
14 ABI The Future of Flood Insurance (https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-issues/Flooding/Government-
and-insurance-industry-flood-agreement/The-Future-of-Flood-Insurance).
15 Reg 2, above n 1.
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This requires a little explanation: imagine a dispute between an insurer and customer over a claim. 
If the insured is a consumer, regulation X applies. If the insured is a business, regulation X does not 
apply. In order for the definition of ‘consumer’ to be relevant to our dispute, the parties have to fail 
to negotiate away their disagreement. It has to be suﬃciently serious - and high value - for lawyers to 
be engaged. This has - again - to fail to produce a settlement of the dispute. The issue before the court 
has then to depend on whether regulation X applies or not, and both parties have to wish to expend 
resources on testing this before a court (rather than just arguing on the substance of the dispute). 
Non-lawyers (and indeed, some lawyers) imagine that contractual disputes are resolved according 
to the law, or the written contract. Some are, but it is a tiny minority. Most cases settle. This process 
of settlement is called ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’. Even when disputes are litigated, parties 
often concede matters of procedure (such as whether the insured is a consumer). We can find cases 
where the court is asked to resolve matters of regulatory coverage, but they are interesting and 
remarkable because they are rare.16 This is why a ‘perfect’ all-encompassing definition of consumer is 
not provided in the legislation, because it is rarely needed, even within contract law disputes.
How does Flood Re diﬀer? Here, the definition of ‘household premises’ is not a regulatory boundary. 
It is a statutory pricing mechanism. Every applicant for insurance needs to be sorted into ‘household 
premises’ and ‘other’ before the appropriate pricing strategy can be applied to their quote. If the risk 
can be ceded to Flood Re then the insurer can pass on that subsidy and sell the same products for 
less. That is a competitive advantage. We cannot wait and see which ones produce disputes and then 
only settle those in court. The adage that hard cases make bad law holds true.
To adopt an ad hoc approach to defining ‘household properties’ might put Flood Re at risk of being 
in breach of statutory duties under the Water Act 2014. It should not reject policies that relate to 
‘households’ nor accept those that do not. It is not hard to imagine the Consumers Association 
carrying out ‘mystery shopper’ investigations to see whether the same result for flood risk pricing is 
applied by MAJOR INSURER A as opposed to MAJOR INSURER B. This runs the risk of becoming a 
regulatory oversight issue for the Financial Conduct Authority.
One way to overcome this would be for a centralised body to determine the limits of ‘household 
premises’ for each and every applicant for insurance. This would appear to be no mean task for a 
Flood Re executive already challenged with overseeing considerable change. The alternative is to 
‘piggy back’ on an existing model and apply Flood Re to properties to which Council Tax applies, 
rather than business taxes. This will still not provide for smooth adaptation when the product shifts 
between categories over time: the occasional Air B‘n’B rental. Moreover, it would leave to the market 
a wide variety of non-commercial properties: eg the local Under 15s Football and Rugby Teams, who 
rent a changing room on a field; or the small charity that oﬀers advice sessions within the community 
it serves. The diﬃculty is that Flood Re promised a more nuanced approach: putting the cost back on 
to business; and simplistic legal models can also produce a political backlash. This was certainly the 
16 See R. (on the application of Bluefin Insurance Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2014] EWHC 3413 (Admin) [whether 
Director’s insurance within FOS scheme] and Bate v Aviva Insurance UK Ltd [2014] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 527 (CA) [impact of ICOBS 
on residential property adapted to partial business use].
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outcome of attempting to shift to market pricing in the US ‘wind risk’ market.17
[IV]. Tentative conclusions
The task facing the management of Flood Re is considerable, and perhaps impossible, at least to 
deliver on all of the objectives of the scheme. It should be noted that attempts to shift the US market 
to risk-based pricing in respect of wind risk were reverted (at least in part) due to contrary public 
reaction.18
My paper can perhaps be reduced to four related points:
 − The long history of flood risk subsidy started when market pricing failed to provide the necessary 
security for households, and the State was not willing to oﬀer a public guarantee. If the cost is to 
be refocused on citizens, then a clearer model of how to deal with the uninsured ought to have 
been adopted.
 − The division between residential households and other properties is more significant in a pricing 
control system than in a standard regulatory intervention, because every possible case has to be 
determined in advance (or at least, as presented) and there needs to be a degree of co-ordination. 
Flood Re must not wrongfully reject or wrongfully accept ‘ceded’ risks.
 − The formalisation of the previous industry practices fails to take into account the revised nature 
of the intervention: it is no longer a ‘lowest cost’ industry practice, but a form of taxation, and 
ought to be based around fundamental principles such as the ability to pay. The flat fee of £10 
may seem inconsequential from the comfort of Westminster, but a quarter of the population are 
uninsured, presumably because for many the cost is already too high.
 − Adjusting the price caps towards risk-based pricing is likely to be extremely diﬃcult. The impact 
on insurance purchasing patterns is likely to diﬀer considerably across the regions, and a neutral 
national pricing plan (let alone one that includes Wales etc) will require very careful research by a 
cross-disciplinary team of geographers, environmental scientists, lawyers and economists.
17 See generally the paper provided by D Hornstein ‘The Insurance Industry on the Cusp of COP 21: Lessons from Flood 
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Flood Re: together, though not all and not forever
Mateusz Bek, LLB Law, LLM Maritime Law, Member of the Insurance Law Research Group,  
University of Southampton
“Utopia lies at the horizon.  
When I draw nearer by two steps,  
it retreats two steps. 
If I proceed ten steps forward, it 
swiftly slips ten steps ahead. 
No matter how far I go, I can never reach it. 
What, then, is the purpose of utopia? 
It is to cause us to advance.” 
Eduardo Galeano
On 14 May 2014, the Water Bill gained Royal Assent and became an Act of Parliament. It laid the 
foundation for the Flood Reinsurance Scheme (‘FR Scheme’) that the government together with 
the Association of British Insurers (‘ABI’) has devised to address concerns arising from consumer 
dissatisfaction with the flood insurance market. The Scheme Document, signed on 16 March 2015, 
describes the FR Scheme and provides a framework within which the FR Scheme administrator, 
ie Flood Re, will administer the FR Scheme. The first draft regulations to establish Flood Re were 
laid before Parliament on 19 March 2015, yet the necessary approval had not been granted before 
Parliament was prorogued amid general election. It is now expected that the operation of the 
scheme will commence in April 2016. The aim of the FR Scheme is to promote the availability and 
aﬀordability of flood insurance for household premises and to manage, over the period of operation 
of the scheme, the transition to risk-reflective pricing. Although much of the detail is yet to be 
determined, it is with these objectives in mind that the few observations below are made within the 
short time available for this talk. 
Solidarity fund
Flood Re’s aggregate annual liability collectively to the insurance industry will be capped at a 
level equivalent to a one in 200 year loss scenario. This is the regulatory capital limit set by the 
Prudential Regulation Authority. In accordance with current actuarial modelling, this would amount 
to approximately £2.5 billion. The scheme will be seeking retrocession protection between £250 
million and the annual aggregate loss level. It is not yet clear what will be the cost of the reinsurance 
arrangement, though an independent estimate shows that it might be significant (Diacon, 2013). 
FR Scheme will be funded primarily by an annual levy (‘Levy 1’ or ‘Type A payment’) on every 
domestic property insurance provider in the UK totalling £180 million, which would notionally 
equate to roughly £10.81 in respect of each household. It will thus constitute a formalisation of 
existing practice whereby around 500,000 properties deemed to be at significant risk of flooding are 
cross-subsidised by a levy on top of the premium on every household insurance policy. 
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The second source of funding will be the reinsurance premium that Flood Re will charge relevant 
insurers in respect of the flood risk element of a combined policy, a buildings only policy or a 
contents only policy, for household premises. These premiums are specified in the draft regulations, 
corresponding with the relevant valuation band based on Council Tax bands for England, Wales and 
Scotland, and rates for Northern Ireland. 
Flood Re will also have the power to request a further payment from the insurance industry either 
in the form of levy or by way of contribution (‘Levy 2’ or ‘Type B payment’) if such is required for 
the prudent management of the scheme or regulatory compliance. In accordance with the Scheme 
Document, the levy is non-returnable while the contribution may be returned during the period of 
operation of the FR Scheme or at, or around, the time of winding up of Flood Re. Bearing in mind 
the level of Levy 1, the fact that Flood Re’s aggregate annual liability collectively to insurers will 
be capped and the capital requirements with which it will have to comply, it is diﬃcult to escape 
the conclusion that the insurance industry will potentially be subjected to a considerable financial 
burden in the initial period of the operation of the scheme. It is worth noting that the ABI had 
initially asked the government to provide a temporary overdraft facility to be triggered in case of 
insuﬃciency of funds for the purpose of satisfying legitimate claims in the early years of the scheme. 
However, the government refused, perhaps based on the financial policy of the day of prioritising the 
preservation of the UK’s credit rating and eschewing voluntarily assumed liabilities.
Ever since flood insurance became widely available in England and Wales, cross-subsidisation has 
been at the heart of market practice. A recent report argued convincingly that such a solidaristic, 
risk-insensitive insurance scheme, in which those at lower risk contribute to the support of those 
at higher risk, is the only model consistent with the notion of fairness as social justice (O’Neill and 
O’Neill, 2012). By contrast, individualist risk-sensitive insurance, whether based on pure actuarial 
or choice-sensitive fairness, would simply be unjust in the context of covering flood risk. Societies 
must eliminate the eﬀects of bad luck and other misfortunes by judging what a more comprehensive 
and fairer market would have done (Dworkin, 2011). Moreover, minimising insecurity of those 
threatened by floods by providing a mechanism inspiring confidence reduces the negative eﬀect 
such events might have upon the wellbeing of citizens and as a result improves the condition of 
the society as a whole (Lindley et al, 2011) The approach taken by the government with respect to 
provision of flood insurance should therefore be commended. Introduction of the scheme improves 
the security of the solution. It also promotes the availability and aﬀordability of flood cover for the 
vast majority of those who otherwise would not be able to aﬀord actuarially sound premiums. 
However, imposing a cap on the aggregate annual liability of the scheme raises a number of questions 
which are relevant both for the consumers and the insurers. First, what would be the manner of 
distribution of the funds accumulated under the scheme in the unlikely event of the quantum of 
the relevant claims exceeding Flood Re’s liability limit in any given year? The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), agreed between the government and the ABI in June 2013, contained a 
somewhat enigmatic statement whereby the government pledged to take ‘primary responsibility 
for deciding how any available resources should be distributed to Flood Re customers’ in the event 
of the cap being exceeded. Following the publication of the Scheme Document, it is now clear that 
Flood Re will only be proportionally liable to relevant insurers in such circumstances. 
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This raises the second question: will the consumers whose policies have been reinsured with Flood 
Re be adequately compensated for their legitimate losses in case the liability limit is triggered? 
Again, the Scheme Document makes it clear that ‘relevant insurers will continue to be liable to 
policyholders in accordance with the terms of the insurance policy sold’. The relationship between 
the assured and the insurer is contractual in nature. Therefore the contractual responsibility 
for paying out to the policyholder, if a valid claim is made, still rests with the relevant insurer. 
Consequently, if a policyholder’s household is flooded, then that policyholder will deal with their 
insurer in the usual way to get their claim paid. However, the relevant insurer may then recover the 
claim from Flood Re in accordance with the reinsurance arrangements on the flood risk element of 
insurance policies ceded to the FR Scheme. Accordingly, should the aggregate annual liability limit of 
Flood Re be triggered, it will be the insurers, and not the consumers, who will bear the direct burden 
of such eventuality. 
The third question relates to the ability of the insurers to limit their liability to the relevant 
policyholders by reference to their reinsurance arrangement with Flood Re. Regardless of whether 
any such term would be caught by the relevant consumer protection legislation, the fact that the 
government, at the same time as laying the foundations for the FR Scheme, provided the Secretary 
of State with the power to require a relevant insurer to issue insurance policies covering particular 
households against the risk of flood, might act as a deterrent from any potentially unfair practice. As 
ever the devil is in the detail. At the moment, there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the 
intricacies of the operation of the scheme.
Unnecessary exclusion 
Not every property at significant risk of flooding will be able to benefit from the operation of the 
scheme. It is not my intention to conduct a thorough discussion of the various exclusions. I intend to 
focus on a single, in my opinion, most important exclusion, namely the exclusion of properties built 
after 1 January 2009. 
This cut-oﬀ date was adopted in the Statement of Principles agreed between the government and the 
ABI in 2008. It is a measure aimed at discouraging development in flood prone areas. It is thought 
to maintain the signal to planning authorities that property development must be appropriate 
and resilient to flooding and to be the most appropriate date based on the current understanding 
of flood risk. In fact, it is arguably arbitrary and reflects the recent failure of government and local 
authorities to take decisive action against construction on flood plains. 
It is true that including additional properties in Flood Re would increase the scheme’s liability and 
require a further subsidy. However, this would be oﬀset to an extent by the additional premium 
income Flood Re would receive by reason of more policies being reinsured with the scheme and 
more properties sharing the burden of contribution towards Levy 1. Moreover, the increase in cost 
could be mitigated by charging as little as an additional £0.13 – £0.21 on top of the £10.81 imposed 
on each household premium for the purpose of funding Levy 1 (ABI, 2013; Rogerson, 2013). It thus 
appears that the FR Scheme could be much more inclusive, and thus socially just, than it will be, at an 
extremely insignificant additional cost to the consumer. 
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It is worth noting that bringing Council Tax Band H properties within the scope of the scheme resulted 
in an increase of the amount levied upon each household insurance premium from £10.50 to £10.81 
(Pickard, 2014). Although exclusion of Band H properties might at first seem reasonable, a proportion 
of these households are thought to be ‘asset rich and cash poor’ and thus otherwise susceptible to social 
injustice resulting from the exclusion. In light of the decision to include those properties in the new 
flood insurance arrangement, leaving out new builds appears even more arbitrary. 
The justification given for not including properties built after 1 January 2009 also appears to 
be unsupported by evidence. The reason for excluding those households from the ambit of the 
Statement of Principles was to discourage development on floodplains. Over the last 15 years 
roughly 9.3% of new dwellings built in England were constructed in areas of high flood risk, ie flood 
plains. Evidence suggests that alternative sites for development are usually simply not available 
(Samuels, 2015). It therefore seems extremely harsh and unjust to exclude those properties from the 
scheme. Would it not be more appropriate to address concerns related to the location of any new 
development through changes to the planning permission and building regulations?
Problematic transition
The FR Scheme is designed to operate for up to 25 years from the date of Royal Assent to the Water 
Act 2014. The framework established by the government and the insurance industry will thus expire 
on 14 May 2039 at the latest, provided that no amendment to the relevant provision is adopted in 
the meantime. This reflects the transitional nature of the FR Scheme, established with a parallel aim 
in mind of achieving risk-reflective pricing of flood insurance for household premises by phasing 
out the benefits of the scheme over its lifetime. It is not yet clear what will happen to the funds 
accumulated under the scheme upon the winding up of Flood Re. 
It is in my opinion inconceivable that a smooth transition to risk-reflective pricing can be brought 
about without a radical change in certain policies. The fundamental tools to create an environment 
for risk reflective pricing lie with the government and not with Flood Re. Even the ABI recognised 
that in the context of climate change, a major shift in approach and resourcing over time will be 
required in order to achieve aﬀordable flood cover at the end of the life of the scheme (ABI, 2014). 
Prohibition of inappropriate development in areas at high risk of flooding as well as a substantial 
increase in central government funding for flood and coastal erosion risk management would 
be crucial in making such a transition attainable. In the UK, flood risks are not as enormous and 
geographically diﬀused as, for instance, in the US where mitigation through flood protection 
measures, however expensive and complex, generates limited impact (Lemann, 2015; Verchick and 
Johnson, 2014). Nonetheless, at the other end of the spectrum, they are neither as manageable as in 
the case of the Netherlands where state of the art flood protection mechanisms safeguard roughly 
64% of the population who are located below the sea level (McVeigh, 2014; Bek et al, 2013). With 
public expenditure under constant scrutiny, it might be extremely diﬃcult to meet the objective set 
by the government. The recent increase in the expenditure related to flood protection is a positive 
indication of the government’s intention to improve the current state of aﬀairs (Defra, 2015), but in 
reality it may scarcely be suﬃcient to maintain the status quo. 
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Furthermore, the FR Scheme’s policy objective might also be seen as overly optimistic. The revised 
Impact Assessment concerning the future of flood insurance (Defra, 2014) contains the following 
answer to the question regarding policy objectives and their intended eﬀects:
“A successful implementation would entail insurance terms adjusting towards risk-
reflective pricing at a pace that allows choices to be made by policyholders facing 
long-term increases in insurance costs unless action is taken, and avoids any risk of 
instability in insurance, mortgage and local housing markets”.
Realistically, consumers with low household income, facing long-term, often substantial, increases 
in premiums for home insurance due to exposure to significant risk of flooding, have no choice but 
to sell their properties to those who are able to aﬀord risk-sensitive pricing and relocate to areas 
which are not similarly exposed. Placing policyholders in such a position seems unfair and thus 
undesirable, especially if they found themselves in this situation through no fault of their own 
(Segall, 2007; Rawls, 2001). This is not the type of transition we would like to see, save in exceptional 
and extreme cases. It is to be hoped that the words “unless action is taken” signify the readiness of 
the government to intervene when necessary. 
A word of caution should also be issued based on the experience of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) in the US, though recognising and respecting all the diﬀerences between NFIP and 
FR Scheme. Coincidentally, the creators of the NFIP also envisaged a cross-subsidy phase-out within 
25 years (Scales, 2006-2007). Almost 47 years later, cross-subsidy is still at the heart of the program 
despite recent eﬀorts to put a sudden end to the practice.  
Conclusion
The establishment of the FR Scheme is a welcome development. It is perhaps the second step, 
after the Statement of Principles, on the journey towards securing availability and aﬀordability of 
flood insurance in the UK. The solidaristic nature of the scheme in addressing what is ultimately a 
catastrophic risk is both fair and just. Regrettably, properties built after 1 January 2009 have been 
unnecessarily excluded from the scope of the new arrangement. It also remains to be seen whether 
the government will manage the transition to risk-reflective pricing over the lifetime of the FR 
Scheme, or whether we will be back to square one on 14 May 2039. 
Since the title of this event is “Future directions of consumer flood insurance in the UK”, I feel 
bound to mention an important issue which remains unresolved in the wake of the creation of the FR 
Scheme. It is the case of low-income uninsured households (Pitt, 2008). It is unlikely that relatively 
poor homeowners living in areas prone to flooding will ever be able to aﬀord market rates for flood 
cover. Imagine that flood insurance is made compulsory across the country. Imagine that flood cover 
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Adding insolvency to injury - a thought experiment on 
the rights of consumers, third parties and flood victims
Abstract
Flood Re is designed to be a reinsurer. It is a well-established feature of insurance law that the 
consumer or other insured cannot ever in theory or practice have any rights against the reinsurer. 
This is due to the simple fact that the consumer or other insured is not a party to the reinsurance 
contract, which is concluded between the insurer and the reinsurer. However, lessons from liability 
insurance teach us that this may lead to undesirable results where the insurer is unwilling or unable 
to pay the insured. While the integrity of reinsurance is important, it will also be an important public 
and social policy question for Flood Re to consider what should happen in a similar situation.1 This 
paper explains the law to illustrate a potential problem of social policy and perceptions; a problem to 
which there probably cannot be a legal solution, but which will need to be addressed in the process of 
setting up Flood Re to help ensure that flood damage payments can be made to those who need it as 
quickly as possible.
Introduction
The immediate purpose of Flood Re is to help ensure that insurers are willing to continue to provide 
flood risk insurance to consumers, and to manage the transition to market prices. While it is not a 
direct purpose, Flood Re is also an important part of overall social policy towards an underlying, 
wider social aim, namely to help prevent widespread devastation and misery where large numbers of 
victims from a variety of social strata and geographical areas suddenly become destitute as a result of 
floods. Such a situation would, as always, result in intensive media and consumer group scrutiny and 
in more or less well-constructed attempts at apportioning blame. It is probably fair to say that Flood 
Re would not escape scrutiny. This paper seeks to explain the legal limits of movement of Flood Re, 
and some limits of the law in helping resolve such issues.
The conundrum can be illustrated by a historic case from liability insurance, which led to the 
introduction of compulsory motor insurance and the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 
1930. In Re Harrington Motor,2 a case from 1927, a claim was made by Mr Chaplin, who had been hit 
by a car sustaining personal injuries. The owner of the car, the Harrington Motor Company, was not 
uninsured, on the contrary, it was insured with the Universal Automobile Insurance Company for 
third party damage and injury. Liability was established and the indemnity paid to the liquidators 
of Harrington – but Mr Chaplin never received any indemnification. Why? Because the owner of 
the car was in insolvent liquidation. Mr Chaplin was not a preferred creditor and his indemnity was 
distributed by the liquidators according to the usual rules to preferred creditors, leaving nothing for 
unsecured, low-preference creditors like Mr Chaplin. Indeed, Mr Chaplin would not even have been 
1 The author wishes to thank Professor Rob Merkin QC, Mateusz Bek and Professor James Davey for productive discussions, 
and takes responsibility for all remaining errors.
2 Harrington Motor Co Ltd Ex p. Chaplin, Re (1927-28) 29 Ll. L. Rep. 102
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in a position to know whether the driver or owner of the car possessed any insurance, as he had no 
legal rights to obtain that information. The Court of Appeal with evident regret concluded that Mr 
Chaplin had no rights in law, nor in equity, to recover from the insurers of the Harrington Motor Co.
The situation of Mr Chaplin, and others like him, caused a member of parliament, Mr Cyril Atkinson, 
to say the following.
“Suppose some wholly irresponsible person driving a motor cycle half kills someone 
and has a judgment against him for £1,000. He has a right to demand payment by 
the insurance company to himself, but there is nothing to compel him to hand over 
that money to the injured person. The injured person is only in the position of an 
ordinary creditor and may never receive a single penny of the money to which he is 
entitled.” 3
This quote outlines the awkward position of an insured retaining the indemnity for himself and not 
paying it on to the injured third party – but it was actually worse than that. In the case of insolvency, 
the insured could benefit from causing insurance losses. The attorney general Sir William Jowitt 
made the following observation about the Harrington Motor case, and others like it:
“One of the Judges in the case suggested that if this sort of thing went on the best 
thing that could happen to the creditors of a man of doubtful solvency was that he 
should run into the most expensive thing he could see in order that when he went 
into bankruptcy it would be quite certain that the insurance company behind him 
would have to pay a large sum of money.” 4
In other words, an insolvent driver wishing to repair his finances might drive around looking for 
expensive things to run into, in order to secure an insurance payment that could then be used to pay oﬀ 
their creditors! The Attorney General was referring to Lord Justice Atkin, whose exact words were:
“it would appear as though a person who is insured against risks and who has general 
creditors whom he is unable to satisfy has only to go out in the street and to find the 
most expensive motor car or the most wealthy man he can to run down, and he will 
at once be provided with assets which will enable him to pay his general creditors 
quite a substantial dividend!” 5
The Third Parties Act
The great debate of the day was the introduction of compulsory motor insurance. Compulsory 
insurance had been pioneered in the context of workers in the late 19th century and revised in the 
Workers Compensation Act 1906. A new feature in the context of motor insurance and in particular 
mass motorism was the unpredictability of the liabilities created in everyday situations which could 
have an impact on anyone using the streets.
3 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1928/apr/17/third-party-indemnity-insurance#S5CV0216P0_19280417_
HOC_114
4 The Attorney General Sir William Jowitt http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1929/oct/29/third-parties-rights-
against-insurers#S5CV0231P0_19291029_HOC_252
5 In Re Harrington Motor Company, Limited. Ex parte Chaplin [1928] Ch. 105, at page 124.
   43
The immediate solution was the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 which created 
the right for the likes of Mr Chaplin to sue the insurer directly for the indemnity. It was a great 
innovation at the time to create compulsory insurance coupled with rights for the injured third party 
who had proven its right to damages to recover them directly from the insurer. However the Third 
Parties Act 1930 itself was far from perfect and was soon afterwards replaced by the Road Traﬃc Act 
1934 for the purpose of motorism. The original Act has recently been replaced by the Third Parties 
(Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010, entering into force in October 2015. It addresses problems 
demonstrated and partially resolved in practice over the years. One such case is worth a little 
attention here to illustrate an interesting moral problem.
The Fanti and The Padre Island (No 2)6 were two cases with the same set of facts, which were 
adjudicated separately at first instance but joined in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. In 
both cases, cargo interests sued the liability insurer of the shipowner. The liability insurers sought 
to defend the claims based on the insurance terms, which provided that all claims must first be paid, 
a so-called pay-to-be-paid clause. The insurers were successful as the House of Lords recognised 
the applicability of the clause – meaning that the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 
was eﬀectively circumvented by the clause. The implications of this result were described by the 
Court of Appeal as driving a coach and horses through the Act. However, the minority judgment of 
Lord Goﬀ clarified that this result would not be accepted in any context other than mutual marine 
liability insurance – the pay-to-be-paid clause was a historically well-established tool designed 
not to circumvent the Act (which it predated) but to protect against the insolvency of individual 
shipowners. Under the Act, any clause that purports to change the rights of the insurers in the event 
of insolvency is eﬀectively null and void.
Lord Goﬀ pointed out that liabilities in the shipping industry are carefully balanced and that it is 
perfectly appropriate to require cargo interests to maintain their own insurance. The shipowners’ 
liability clubs were essentially mutuals covering each other’s liabilities and it was not right that the 
insolvent shipowner should be covered by other members. Lord Goﬀ also made it abundantly clear 
that the case under consideration was one of cargo insurance and that if it were to transpire that 
the shipowners’ liability insurers were adopting the practice of not paying personal injury claims, 
the position should be reconsidered by the legislator. This case, and the diﬀerence in philosophy 
between the majority judgment and the minority speech of Lord Goﬀ is illustrative of a moral 
dilemma to which we will return later.
Under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010, the third party has the right to sue the 
insurer directly, so that there is now only a need for one set of proceedings, between the third party 
and the insurers. This litigation can determine all the issues including the insured’s liability to the 
third party. For marine insurance, there is no change except that personal injury claims which were 
earlier (in pursuance of the minority judgment of Lord Goﬀ in The Fanti and The Padre Island (No 2)) 
paid on a voluntary basis must now be paid.7 The 2010 Act applies to ‘voluntarily incurred liabilities’8 
and there is a right to information from any person who might know about the contract of insurance, 




to help the third party gauge whether there is a valid and applicable insurance policy. The third party 
can thus assess whether there is a contract of insurance, who the insurer is, what the relevant terms 
are, the claims position etc.
A thought experiment
While the Third Parties Act applies to liability insurance, not reinsurance, there is a way in which 
the situation under the Third Parties Act can illustrate a potential issue with Flood Re. What if 
an insurer participating in Flood Re were to become insolvent? Flood Re is eﬀectively a mutual 
reinsurer, entirely funded and owned by the reinsureds themselves, albeit with backup in the shape 
of protection under the Water Act 2014 and the possibility of extending a guarantee from the State 
in case of temporary diﬃculties.9 As a result, there may well arise a situation where Flood Re has 
funds committed and allocated, but they cannot be paid out in such a way that they ultimately 
benefit the assured. The question is how such a situation would be resolved. The Fanti and The Padre 
Island (No 2) itself is no direct guidance. Any insurance lawyer would immediately conclude that a 
case on liability insurance is no direct precedent to a reinsurance case. Would the reasoning from 
Lord Brandon’s majority judgment be more appropriate, protecting Flood Re finances from the 
insolvency of the participating insurers? Or should one take the position of protecting the insureds, 
who as consumers are more akin to the personal injury claimants of Lord Goﬀ’s reasoning than to 
the cargo claimants whose claims were in fact at issue?
The common feature of reinsurance and liability insurance is that there is no entitlement at common 
law for anyone other than the insured under the contract to receive any indemnity. It was possible to 
create such a channel for third parties with the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, but 
those rights were restricted to cases of insolvency. In other contexts, the right exists when insurance 
is compulsory: with motor insurance, the injured third party can contact their own insurer if they 
have one, but can also go directly to the insurer of the driver at fault.10 Insurance is compulsory also 
for some marine liabilities, and the third party then has a right to claim directly from the insurer.11 
Direct action in such compulsory insurance situations is generally a common feature in many 
jurisdictions and is arguably an essential tool to making compulsory insurance work. A clue to why is 
given by Lord Sumner in the historical debates mentioned earlier.
Insolvency of insurers
Lord Sumner, a judicial member of the House of Lords at the time, said the following in a House of 
Lords debate about the rights of third parties under a proposed bill introducing compulsory motor 
insurance:
“Have your Lordships conceived the case of an owner-driver who has nothing in 
the world except his clothes and the car that he owns, and the magnificent spirits 
which he enjoys? He is sued to judgment. The insurance company may take the risk 
of paying direct to the injured person if it likes to take the risk, but in so doing it runs 
9 It appears unlikely at this stage that a terminal funds shortage would be resolved by the State; but that would seem to be a 
rather remote possibility in any case. See article of Mateusz Bek in this volume.
10 Now the Road Traﬃc Act 1988.
11 Usually under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.
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a risk. Of course it must pay the right person. You have to make the debtor bankrupt 
on your judgment, and then the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to collect from the 
insurance company, and if there is only one creditor the trustee will pay the money 
to the plaintiﬀ. If, however, there is more than one creditor the widow and orphan 
may only get 6d. in the £. That is the way in which this scheme will work.” 12
In other words, the insured’s insolvency would inevitably eat up the indemnity that according to the 
scheme being debated should have been reserved for the third party.
Lord Sumner was discussing a third party situation, not one where the insured is itself an insurer. 
Insurers these days do not become insolvent out of the blue. We have prudential rules and Solvency 
rules, and Solvency II just around the corner.13 However, Flood Re is designed to deal with the 
contingency of the catastrophe. It is therefore appropriate to consider where the contingency will 
take us – What If the insurer becomes insolvent? What if the third party is unable to recover from 
the insurer? Can the insurer’s liquidators still recover from Flood Re and retain the indemnity for 
distribution to the insurer’s creditors? Should there be a mechanism for the consumer insured to 
recover directly from Flood Re?
Flood Re is designed as reinsurance and it is a basic concept of insurance law, that the insured has 
no contractual relations with the reinsurer, and no rights to claim directly against the reinsurer. The 
insured is not in the position of a third party, who might be entitled to claim from the insurer under 
the Third Parties Act - but should they be? Ought the insured to have some form of contingency 
rights against Flood Re? The unanimous answer of all parts of the insurance industry to this question 
must be a resounding no – but will a consumer overcome with flood and resulting loss of personal 
possessions, stress, ill health and facing the loss of their single most valuable asset see it that way?
The need will not be overwhelming in the case of an insolvent insurer, for the simple reason that 
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme is available to meet any insurance claims where the 
insurer is insolvent. The FSCS will work with the insurer’s liquidators to make sure claims are met, 
and will have the ambition to assist claimants who are in urgent need as soon as possible. However, 
Flood Re is already a high profile body, even before it begins operations, and it is not diﬃcult to 
imagine a situation where flood claimants are desperately looking for help, having been let down by 
their insurers and the liquidators and FSCS are unable to cope with demand.
Reinsurance
The fact that the “benefits to high flood risk insurance households” that Flood Re is designed to 
provide are intended to be phased out within 25 years14 means that the entity must either disappear 
at the end of that time, or become a profit-making enterprise. If Flood Re is to be phased out, it will 
be crucial to consider end-of-life issues already at the setting up stage, so that Flood Re does not 
take on larger liabilities than it can meet. The phasing out of a reinsurer is an infinitely complex 
12 Lord Sumner in Hansard, available at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1926/jun/30/motor-vehtclks-compulsory-
insurance-bill#S5LV0064P0_19260630_HOL_33 at [699].
13 Entering into force at long last on 1 January 2016.
14 MOU para 1: https://consult.defra.gov.uk/flooding/floodinsurance/supporting_documents/20130626%20Flood%20
Insurance%20MOU%20June%202013%20unprotected.pdf (accessed on 12 June 2015).
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operation. If on the other hand Flood Re is to become a competitive reinsurer, it will by the end of 
the 25 years need to be capable of operating on market terms and premiums for reinsurance, and will 
need to submit to prudential regulation (by then surely Solvency II!). The support of the Water Act 
2014 will cease to be applicable for competition law reasons.
On the positive side, while insurers will be in charge of assessing which policies have a high risk 
threshold, it will be Flood Re that decides on what terms these are reinsured. The industry will 
absorb a stipulated excess.
It seems likely that Flood Re will be writing non-proportional rather than proportional reinsurance. 
In proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer takes a percentage of the premium and a percentage of 
the risk. In non-proportional reinsurance, the reinsurer takes a fixed premium and there are excesses 
and limits applicable to the reinsurance contract. The latter is a closer fit for what is currently 
known about the terms of Flood Re: the premiums will be fixed according to mathematics that aim 
to reproduce the current subsidy. This does not matter much to the consumer, because either way 
they are unable to recover under the reinsurance contract. What matters is the reinsured’s (the 
insurer’s) ability to recover from Flood Re. In the event of insolvency, that ability is aﬀected not just 
by the insurer’s ability to pay the consumer their claim, but also by the order in which the claims are 
decided.
In Charter Re v Fagan,15 the House of Lords went to great lengths to interpret a contract clause 
stipulating that the reinsured must first pay the insured, before it could collect under the 
reinsurance. Their Lordships, in an intricately reasoned judgment by Lord Mustill, made very 
clear that reinsurers would not be entitled to benefit from the privilege aﬀorded to marine liability 
insurers some half a dozen years earlier in The Fanti and The Padre Island (No 2):16 while marine 
liability insurers were entitled to rely on their ‘pay to be paid’ clause to reject direct claims by cargo 
insureds, reinsurers could not reject claims by reinsureds in reliance upon a ‘sums actually paid’ 
clause. Lord Mustill said that at first sight, those words might seem like they meant “sums that had 
actually been paid by the reinsured to the direct insured”, but in fact whether a sum had actually 
been paid was a matter of looking at the final accounts when they had been settled, whether or not 
the sums owed had in fact been paid. The reinsurer therefore had to pay.
In Charter Re, the issue was purely one of contract interpretation. There is little or no statute 
applicable to reinsurance and indeed the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 has never 
applied to reinsurance. There is no change to the law on this point under the Third Parties (Rights 
Against Insurers) Act 2010, section 15 of which reads:
“This Act does not apply to a case where the liability referred to in section 1(1) is 
itself a liability incurred by an insurer under a contract of insurance.”
As a result, an insurer who is entitled under a reinsurance contract to recover the indemnity from the 
reinsurer under the terms of the reinsurance will always be entitled to do so, even if they have not in 
fact first paid the insured and ultimately may never be able to do so due to insolvency. The insurer 
15 Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] AC 313.
16 Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (The Fanti) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191.
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may therefore be paid by Flood Re but may, just as in Harrington Motor, end up paying out that 
money according to insolvency rules rather than under the insurance contract.
As mentioned above, it appears that the reinsurance cover oﬀered by Flood Re to insurers will be 
non-proportional. If so, Teal v Berkley,17 a case of reinsurance of a liability insurance policy, becomes 
relevant. In that case, a liability insurance policy covered claims from the USA and Canada, and 
outside those countries. The final layer of the reinsurance policy did not cover US or Canadian 
claims. As a result it was beneficial for the insured and its liability insurer to pick and choose US and 
Canadian claims to be met under the first layers of the policy, to maximise the sum that could be 
recovered from reinsurers. However, the result of that case was that insurers were not permitted 
to choose how to deal with the various insurance claims, but had to give them priority in the order 
in which they arose, and in which the liability was confirmed. As a result, the insurer had to retain 
the claims that happened first, and could only claim under the reinsurance for claims arising later. 
In the flood context, an early claim might fall under the insurer’s deductible, while a later claim 
might be within the cover, and a further one yet again may fall outside the cap set for Flood Re for 
claims in individual years. This becomes important if one imagines a scenario such as the Thames 
overflowing starting at its source in the West and moving eastwards. Diﬀerent regions would be 
treated diﬀerently, with some being covered only by the insurer under its deductible, and others 
being covered under the reinsurance.
A thought experiment on the law - without a legal solution
Ultimately, the purpose of Flood Re is not at all to provide direct benefits to flood victims. It is 
designed to provide indirect benefits, by ensuring that insurers are willing to keep writing flood 
insurance, and to manage the transition to market prices over 25 years. It is for both legal and 
organisational reasons not possible to allow consumers to claim directly from Flood Re. However, 
Flood Re is a highly visible body, even before it oﬃcially begins operating. It is likely to receive some 
unwelcome attention as soon as there is a problem with managing flood claims.
Even on the assumption that the Third Parties Act and the type of situation it is meant to resolve 
is not an issue because all insurers will always remain solvent, the following thought experiment is 
worth considering: what will a consumer think, who is in dire straits following a flood event, and who 
does not receive its indemnification from the insurer because the insurer is overloaded with claims, 
or because the insurer has some legitimate reason for delaying payment of the claim? A consumer 
may well take the view that it is entitled to the funds sitting in Flood Re, which are a direct result of 
the consumer’s premium payments.
The Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 is not applicable to Flood Re – and it is not for a 
moment suggested that it should be. Flood Re is being set up to provide reinsurance, which is a beast 
very diﬀerent from liability insurance. We are considering here a situation where we are enjoying 
the luxury of a well-funded Flood Re but catastrophic losses resulting in the demise of an insurer, 
entitled to claim from Flood Re. If that demise were the result of wide-spread flooding, the claims 
against the original insurer would be unmet while there would be a contingent entitlement for that 
insurer to claim from Flood Re. Such wide-spread floods should be highly unlikely – but at the very 
17 [2013] UKSC 57
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nature of what we are dealing with here is the catastrophic event, the highly unlikely event or indeed 
several such events in succession impacting a geographically focused insurer.
Alternatively, an insurer could meet its demise for unrelated reasons, such as poor management of 
investments. That is again unlikely because of prudential management rules – but unlikely is not 
impossible in the financial services sector, as demonstrated by the demise of Barings’ Bank, Bear 
Sterns and Lehman Brothers. In such a case the knock-on eﬀects on the confidence in the consumer 
market with Flood Re possessing the funds but “unwilling” to pay might add to a serious public 
image problem for the consumer insurance sector.
There are various ways of mitigating the impact of insurer insolvency, not least the FSCS scheme 
which is the first line of defence in such a situation. Other solutions may look feasible on paper, 
but are an uneasy fit under the law. While making the Third Parties Act directly applicable to Flood 
Re might look like a simple solution, this would mean creating an exception from section 15 of the 
Third Parties Act. This would be a both strange and unjustifiable diﬀerence compared to other 
reinsurance. It would for competition reasons rule out any prospect of creating a reinsurer capable 
of competing on equal market terms at the end of the 25 year period. Another solution that may look 
feasible is to permit claims directly against Flood Re in the event of insolvency, on a case by case 
basis – but that would mean setting up a claims management framework specifically for the insurer’s 
insolvency which would mean double costs for Flood Re – a loss of future premium income from 
the insolvent insurer, including supplementary calls, combined with extra costs for managing the 
run-oﬀ of claims against it. It seems that this would lead to large costs which could be avoided. In 
addition, if not all direct insurance claims will be met by Flood Re because of deductibles or caps, the 
direct claims route presents insurmountable problems. Are there other options capable of achieving 
socially satisfactory results through financial services regulation? Perhaps, but if there are no other 
options, those managing Flood Re will need to be on guard against such possible developments and 
will need to protect Flood Re from potential damage to its consumer reputation. Ultimately, this is a 
question of reputation management – but as hopefully shown here the issues are complex and it may 
well prove a challenge to present them in digestible form.
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Flood insurance
Further information about the work of the 
Insurance Law Research Group on flood 
insurance is available on our web page  
www.southampton.ac.uk/ilrg/research/
flood_insurance.page
The report Future availability of flood 
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